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Teaching that Speech Matters: 
A Framework for Analyzing Speech 
Issues in Schools 
Erwin Chemerinsky* 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Morse v. Frederick continues a 
pattern of judicial unwillingness to protect student speech.  A key flaw in 
the Court’s approach is in failing to draw a distinction between 
government control over the curriculum (and even student speech in 
curricular activities) and student speech outside the school’s curriculum.  
Deference to school officials is appropriate in the former, but not in the 
latter.  Unfortunately, the Court’s approach, as reflected in its last few 
decisions concerning student speech, has been uncritical deference to 
schools and far too little protection of student speech. 
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Courts in recent years have provided little protection for student 
speech, least of all when it is involved in curricular activities.1  But the 
distinction between “curricular” and “non-curricular” makes little 
sense when the speech is a school newspaper, and the censorship has 
nothing to do with course instruction.  Instead, courts should focus on 
whether the government’s choices about speech are in the curricular 
 
 * Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine, 
School of Law. 
 1 In other words, a sensible approach can be drawn between the need for 
deference to school officials when regulating speech in curricular activities, but much 
less deference when it is student speech outside curricular areas. 
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or non-curricular context.  Courts should accord schools great 
deference in deciding their curriculum, but should be very protective 
of student speech in the non-curricular realm.   
My proposed approach, unlike the Court’s analysis, gives great 
weight to the importance of free speech in schools.  All of the values of 
freedom of expression exist in educational institutions.  Indeed, 
protecting freedom of speech advances a core goal of school 
education:  teaching students about the Constitution and their rights.  
At the very least, there is dissonance, if not hypocrisy, in teaching 
students that free speech matters when school officials themselves 
provide virtually no protection for student speech. 
Almost forty years ago, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District,2 the Supreme Court articulated a standard 
for balancing the free speech rights of students with the educational 
mission of schools.  The Court held that the government could punish 
student speech only if there was a showing that the expression was 
actually disruptive of school activities.3  In the four decades since 
Tinker, the Court has abandoned this approach, especially as to 
curricular activities.  The current approach emphasizes great deference 
to school officials.  I believe that it is time to return to the Tinker 
approach, though I think that the Court’s recent decision in Morse v. 
Frederick4 certainly indicates that it is unlikely to do so.5  
To be clear, in the curricular context, schools can regulate and 
evaluate student speech when it relates directly to the curriculum and 
education.  For example, teachers can punish students for talking out of 
turn or disrupting class with speech that is irrelevant to the discussion.  
Likewise, teachers, of course, can evaluate student work and give grades 
based on its content and quality.  But these are not the issues usually 
presented in student speech cases and certainly were not the facts of the 
leading Supreme Court cases dealing with student speech. 
 
 2 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 3 Id. at 514.  
 4 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
 5 Id. at 2621 (holding that “schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to 
their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use”).  
However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Alito (joined by Justice Kennedy) argued that 
Morse reaffirmed and was consistent with Tinker.  Id. at 2636-37 (Alito, J., concurring).  
But on careful analysis Morse is quite different from Tinker.  In Tinker, the Supreme 
Court said that the government may punish student speech only if it is actually 
disruptive of school activity.  There was no suggestion of such disruption in Morse.  The 
Court’s decision in Morse expressed the need for great deference to school authorities 
when they punish student speech.  Tinker emphatically rejected such deference. 
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Part I of this Article describes the Supreme Court’s abandonment of 
free speech principles in cases involving the regulation of student 
speech.  Part II argues that student speech is fundamentally different 
from school or government speech.  School choices concerning the 
actual curriculum are government speech and not vulnerable to First 
Amendment challenges.  The flaw is that the Court uses the First 
Amendment rationale that governs government speech to justify 
restricting student speech.  There is a critical distinction between the 
government as speaker in setting the curriculum and the government as 
regulator in punishing student speech.  Finally, Part III criticizes the 
Court’s approach and argues for much more robust protection for 
student speech in public elementary and secondary schools.  I urge a 
return to the Tinker standard:  non-curricular student speech should be 
punishable in schools only if it is actually disruptive of school activities. 
Ultimately, this Article suggests a framework for analyzing free 
speech issues in the school context.  Decisions concerning the content 
of curriculum are government speech, and so there needs to be great 
judicial deference.  But school officials should only censor or punish 
student speech if there is proof that the expression actually disrupts 
school activities. 
I. THE ABANDONMENT OF FREE SPEECH PROTECTION IN SCHOOLS 
The key Supreme Court case distinguishing between speech in 
curricular as opposed to non-curricular areas was Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier.6  A journalism class, with approval from the 
faculty advisor, was going to produce a school newspaper containing 
stories about students’ experience with pregnancy and divorce.7  While 
the articles discussed student experiences, none referenced specific 
student names.8  The principal decided to publish the newspaper 
without these articles.9  The principal believed that the article on 
pregnancy discussed sexual activity and birth control in a manner 
inappropriate for some of the younger students at the school.10  
Additionally, the principal was concerned that the anonymous 
students in the article on pregnancy might be identified from other 
 
 6 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 7 No students’ names were included in the article on pregnancy, and one name 
was mentioned in the article on divorce, although the name had been deleted after the 
paper had been forwarded to the principal for review.  Id. at 263. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 264. 
 10 Id. at 263. 
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aspects of the article.11  Furthermore, the principal believed that the 
parents identified in the article about divorce should have had the 
opportunity to respond to the article’s contents.12  Three former 
student members of the school newspaper sued, contending that 
school officials had violated their First Amendment rights.13 
The Supreme Court upheld the principal’s decision and rejected the 
former students’ First Amendment challenge.  At the outset, Justice 
White, writing for the Court, quoted Tinker:  “Students in the public 
schools do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”’14  But he then added, quoting 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,15 the “First Amendment rights 
of students in the public schools ‘are not automatically coextensive 
with the rights of adults in other settings.”’16  Most significantly, 
Justice White then quoted the declaration in Bethel:  “‘The 
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school 
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.’”17 
Justice White concluded the school newspaper was a nonpublic 
forum and as a result “school officials were entitled to regulate the 
content[ ] of [the school newspaper] in any reasonable manner.”18  In 
other words, only rational basis review applied.  The Court 
emphasized the ability of schools to control curricular decisions, such 
as the content of school newspapers published as part of journalism 
classes.19  Justice White wrote: 
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to 
tolerate particular student speech – the question that we 
addressed in Tinker – is different from the question whether 
the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to 
promote particular student speech.  The former question 
addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal 
expression that happens to occur on the school premises.  The 
 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 504. 
 14 Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
506 (1969)). 
 15 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.  Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
 16 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). 
 17 Id. at 267 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 
(1986)).  
 18 Id. at 270. 
 19 See id. at 271. 
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latter question concerns educators’ authority over school-
sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other 
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of 
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of 
the school.20 
The Court stated, in this context, schools have broad authority to 
regulate student speech.  Justice White wrote: 
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over . . . 
student expression to assure that participants learn whatever 
lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or 
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate 
for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual 
speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.21 
Justice White concluded that the students’ First Amendment claim 
should be denied because the school’s action was reasonable.22  Justice 
White emphasized that the judiciary must defer to school officials:  
“This standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the 
education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of 
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of 
federal judges.”23 
The Supreme Court has had only one student speech case since 
Hazelwood. In Morse v. Frederick,24 the connection of the student 
speech to the curricular decisions of the school was even more 
attenuated.  Hazelwood involved a newspaper produced as part of a 
high school journalism class.  In Morse, the speech was outside the 
school, though during school hours.  When the Olympic torch came 
through Juneau, Alaska, a high school released its students from class 
to watch.25  As the torchbearer passed by, Joseph Frederick and his 
friends, students at the high school, unfurled a banner with the 
inscription, “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”26  Deborah Morse, the principal, 
immediately demanded that the students take down the banner.  
Frederick, however, refused.27  Morse, believing that the banner 
 
 20 Id. at 270-71. 
 21 Id. at 271. 
 22 Id. at 272. 
 23 Id. at 273. 
 24 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).  
 25 Id. at 2622. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
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encouraged drug use, confiscated it, and suspended Frederick.28 The 
Court held that the First Amendment was not violated when Frederick 
was subsequently punished for displaying the banner.29   
In an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court said that the 
principal could reasonably interpret the banner as encouraging illegal 
drug use and that schools have an important interest in stopping such 
speech.30  Chief Justice Roberts stressed that this was an official school 
activity and that deference to the schools is appropriate in this 
context.31  He wrote:   
School principals have a difficult job, and a vitally important 
one.  When Frederick suddenly and unexpectedly unfurled his 
banner, Morse had to decide to act–or not act–on the spot.  It 
was reasonable for her to conclude that the banner promoted 
illegal drug use–in violation of established school policy–and 
that failing to act would send a powerful message to the 
students in her charge, including Frederick, about how serious 
the school was about the dangers of illegal drug use.32   
In other words, Morse takes the Hazelwood distinction between 
curricular and non-curricular and finds that deference to school 
officials should extend to all official school activities.   
This is not the first case to draw this distinction.  In Bethel — which 
Chief Justice Roberts expressly invokes and relies upon in Morse — 
the Court upheld the punishment of a student for giving a speech 
nominating another student for a position in student government, 
which was filled with sexual innuendo, at a school assembly.33  The 
school suspended the student for a few days and kept him from 
speaking at his graduation as scheduled.34  The Court upheld the 
punishment and emphasized the need for judicial deference to 
educational institutions.35  
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Bethel, emphasized 
not the need for protecting student speech, but the need for regulating 
it.36  He began by stressing the importance of schools in 
 
 28 Id. at 2622-23. 
 29 Id. at 2622. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 2624. 
 32 Id. at 2629. 
 33 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986). 
 34 Id. at 678. 
 35 Id. at 683.  
 36 See id. at 683. 
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“inculcat[ing]” the “habits and manners of civility,”37 and then 
declared:  “The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and 
controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced 
against the society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”38  He concluded:   
A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually 
explicit monologue . . . .  [I]t was perfectly appropriate for the 
school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils 
that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent 
with the “fundamental values” of public school education.39 
Most significantly, Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion proclaimed 
the need for judicial deference to the authority and expertise of school 
officials.  He stated:  “The determination of what manner of speech in 
the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests 
with the school board.”40  In fact, Chief Justice Burger concluded his 
majority opinion by quoting with approval Justice Black’s dissenting 
opinion in Tinker:  “‘I wish therefore, . . . to disclaim any purpose . . . 
to hold that the Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, 
and elected school officials to surrender control of the American 
public school system to public school students.’”41 
Thus, the Supreme Court’s decisions over the last forty years since 
Tinker have been clear:  there is great deference to school officials in 
regulating student speech in official school activities.  There is no 
requirement that the speech actually disrupt school activities or that there 
be any proof that the speech actually causes any harm.  Tinker has never 
been expressly overruled, but it has been tremendously undermined.  As 
Mark Yudof stated:  “Although these [later decisions] have not 
specifically overruled Tinker [sic], Tinker’s [sic] progeny have greatly 
altered the holding set forth by the Warren Court.”42  In fact, some lower 
courts have even questioned whether Tinker survives at all.43 
 
 37 Id. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 228 (1968)). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 685-86. 
 40 Id. at 683. 
 41 Id. at 686 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
526 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)).  
 42 Mark Yudof, Tinker Tailored:  Good Faith, Civility, and Student Expression, 69 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 365, 366 (1995). 
 43 Cf. Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737-38 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that Supreme Court has “cast some doubt on the extent to which students 
retain free speech rights in the school setting”). 
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II. RESTORING THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
There is a distinction to be drawn between speech in curricular as 
opposed to non-curricular matters in schools.  The key — which the 
Supreme Court and often lower courts ignore — is whether it is 
school speech as opposed to student speech.  Schools need broad 
latitude in what they choose to teach students.  Any choice as to the 
content of the curriculum involves subject matter and even viewpoint 
discrimination by the school.  There is no basis for a First Amendment 
challenge to these choices by school officials.  But the ability of 
schools to decide what to teach students in classes does not then carry 
over to allow the school to regulate student speech.   
There has not been a Supreme Court case concerning First 
Amendment challenges to curricular decisions by a school.  The 
closest the Court has come to this issue was in Board of Education, 
Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, which considered 
the ability of a school library to remove books because they were 
deemed “objectionable.”44  In this case, the Court stated that the “First 
Amendment rights of students may be directly and sharply implicated 
by the removal of books from the shelves of a school library.”45  The 
Court explained that the First Amendment protects a right to receive 
information, and that the “special characteristics of the school library 
make that environment especially appropriate for the recognition of 
the First Amendment rights of students.”46  The Court held that 
whether removal of books from school libraries violated the First 
Amendment depends upon the motivation behind the government’s 
actions.  The Court explained:   
If [the government] intended by their removal decision to deny 
respondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, 
and if this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners’ 
decision, then petitioners have exercised their discretion in 
violation of the Constitution . . . . On the other hand, . . . an 
unconstitutional motivation would not be demonstrated if it 
were shown that petitioners had decided to remove the books 
at issue because those books were pervasively vulgar.47   
The Court remanded the case for a determination of this issue. 
 
 44 457 U.S. 853, 856 (1982). 
 45 Id. at 866. 
 46 Id. at 868. 
 47 Id. at 871 (footnote omitted).  
  
2009] Teaching that Speech Matters 833 
The Court’s decision in Pico makes clear that the government has 
“broad discretion in the management of school affairs,” particularly in 
selecting curriculum.48  There is no First Amendment basis for objecting 
to the government’s choices in its curriculum because the government 
expresses a particular viewpoint.  Inevitably, curricula will reflect the 
views of the government.  Curriculum is government speech, and there 
is no First Amendment basis for objecting when the government 
chooses to speak (unless it violates a specific limitation, such as the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).  The Fifth Circuit best 
summarized this principle when it declared:  “The government 
undoubtedly has the authority to control its own message when it 
speaks or advocates a position it believes is in the public interest.”49  
The Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized that the government 
may speak and that there is no basis for a First Amendment claim 
objecting to the government’s expressive choices.50  For example, in 
Rust v. Sullivan, the Court considered whether the government was 
engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination when it prohibited 
recipients of federal funds from giving abortion-related advice.51  The 
Court rejected the First Amendment challenge and declared:   
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, 
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it 
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time 
funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the 
problem in another way.  In so doing, the Government has not 
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen 
to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.52  
In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, the 
Court applied this principle directly to the education context and held 
for the government on the following basis:  “When the University 
determines the content of the education it provides, it is the University 
speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the 
content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it 
enlists private entities to convey its own message.”53   
 
 48 Id. at 863-64. 
 49 Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 612 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 50 See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) (stating that 
generic advertising funded by targeted assessment on beef producers was “government 
speech,” not susceptible to First Amendment compelled-subsidy challenge). 
 51 500 U.S. 173, 177 (1991). 
 52 Id. at 193. 
 53 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). 
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In other cases as well, the Court has been emphatic that when the 
government is speaking as to matters of curriculum there is absolutely 
no basis for a First Amendment challenge.  For instance, in Arkansas 
Education Television Communication v. Forbes, the Court upheld the 
ability of a government-owned television station to limit a public 
debate to candidates from major parties.54  The Court explained:   
Much like a university selecting a commencement speaker, a 
public institution selecting speakers for a lecture series, or a 
public school prescribing its curriculum, a broadcaster by its 
nature will facilitate the expression of some viewpoints instead 
of others.  Were the judiciary to require, and so to define and 
approve, pre-established criteria for access, it would risk 
implicating the courts in judgments that should be left to the 
exercise of . . . discretion.55  
The error in the Court’s student speech decisions is in failing to 
draw a distinction between the speech of the government institution 
and the speech of the students.  From this perspective, Morse and for 
that matter Tinker, are clearly not government speech.  Hazelwood, 
though, is a harder case because it involves a newspaper published by 
the school, though written by the students.  In the government speech 
cases described in Forbes,56 Rust,57 and Rosenberger,58 the government 
is not regulating the speech of those outside the government — it is 
just choosing the message that it wants to adopt.  But in the student 
newspaper context, like Hazelwood, it is very much the government 
regulating the speech of others. 
Thus, the First Amendment status of student speech in student 
newspapers  cannot be resolved by the distinction between 
government and private speech or even by labeling the newspaper a 
non-public forum (as the Court did in Hazelwood).  It is 
fundamentally different from traditional non-public forums in that it is 
 
 54 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998). 
 55 Id. at 674 (emphasis added). 
 56 Id. at 669 (concerning speech and programming content of state-owned public 
television station). 
 57 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177 (concerning Department of Health and 
Human Services regulations which limit ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in 
abortion-related activities). 
 58 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822-23 (relating to state university’s decision to fund 
printing costs of certain student publications). 
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a place created for speech purposes.  A newspaper, unlike say a 
military base59 or an airport,60 exists for speech purposes. 
The treatment of student newspapers must depend on the basis for 
the government regulation.  If it is a choice related to the curricular 
mission of student newspapers, there must be great deference to the 
government.  For example, if the journalism teacher chooses not to 
publish an article because of a quality judgment about it or its writing, 
judicial deference is necessary.  But that, of course, was not what 
occurred in Hazelwood.  In that case, the journalism teacher approved 
the articles.  Once the paper was at the printer, the principal ordered 
that articles be omitted because he thought that high school students 
should not read about teenage pregnancy or the effects of divorce.  This 
had nothing to do with curricular decisions.  Arguably, it is a decision 
about education, and from that perspective it is quite troubling. 
Schools have long claimed that they have an important mission of 
inculcating in students a knowledge of, and respect for, the principles 
of the Constitution.  For example, in Ambach v. Norwich, the Court 
upheld the ability of schools to exclude non-citizens from holding 
teaching positions.61  The Court said that teachers are integral to self-
government because they are responsible for inculcating democratic 
values in youth.62  The Court explained that “a teacher has an 
opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, 
the political process, and a citizen’s social responsibilities.  This 
influence is crucial to the continued good health of a democracy.”63 
From this perspective Hazelwood, and also cases like Bethel and 
Morse, are troubling because they do not recognize the important role of 
the First Amendment in the context of schools.  When schools censor 
or punish student speech, it is antithetical to teaching the importance of 
speech.  All of the traditional values of protecting speech, apply just as 
much in schools as in any other context.  This, of course, is not to say 
that all student speech is protected under all circumstances.  But nor is 
all speech protected under all circumstances outside of the school 
context.  Affording deference to school officials in regulating speech 
related to curricular decisions is important because it gives schools great 
latitude to control the education of students.  But speech outside of 
 
 59 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that  military bases are 
non-public forums). 
 60 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) 
(holding that airports are non-public forums). 
 61 441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979). 
 62 Id. at 79. 
 63 Id. 
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curricular decisions, as in Tinker, Bethel, Hazelwood, and Morse, 
warrants far less deference to school officials. 
The response to this is that all decisions by school officials concern 
the education of students and thus courts should defer to school 
regulation of student speech.  But this argument leaves no role for 
freedom of speech in schools.  It also assumes that just because a 
principal asserts that something is done for educational reasons, 
courts must step aside and accept that conclusion.  There is a clear 
difference between the government choosing the curriculum it will 
teach and the government deciding that it does not like a certain 
message, such as a banner that the principal interprets as encouraging 
illegal drug use.  The latter raises the traditional First Amendment 
concern of the government controlling the content of messages by 
speakers.  This poses an inherently different constitutional question 
than when the government is choosing what it wants to have taught in 
a particular part of the curriculum. 
III. THE STANDARD FOR REGULATING STUDENT SPEECH 
Almost forty years ago, in Tinker, the Supreme Court articulated a 
standard for when schools can punish student speech.  Tinker is a 
desirable standard because it preserves the ability of schools to punish 
speech that disrupts the educational process while protecting student 
expression that is not disruptive.  Unfortunately, the Court has since 
abandoned Tinker, as most recently and strongly evidenced in Morse.  
In Tinker, three high school students chose to wear armbands to 
protest the Vietnam War.64  The school suspended them for doing so.65  
The Supreme Court, in a 7–2 decision, ruled in favor of the students’ 
free speech rights and against the school’s.  
Justice Fortas wrote the opinion for the majority and expressed 
three important themes concerning students’ rights that constitute the 
speech protective model.  First, students retain constitutional rights 
within schools.66  After his famous declaration that students do not 
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate,”67 Fortas states:  “This has been the 
unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 [sic] years.”68  After 
a long string of citations to many prior Supreme Court rulings, Justice 
 
 64 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
 65 Id. 
 66 See id. at 506. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
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Fortas quotes Justice Robert Jackson’s eloquent opinion from West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette69: 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, 
protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its 
creatures—Boards of Education not excepted.  These have, of 
course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, 
but none that they may not perform within the limits of the 
Bill of Rights.  That they are educating the young for 
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of 
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to 
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to 
discount important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes.70  
Later in his majority opinion, Justice Fortas returns to this theme and 
powerfully proclaims the free speech rights of students.  Fortas declares: 
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of 
totalitarianism.  School officials do not possess absolute authority 
over their students.  Students in school as well as out of school 
are “persons” under our Constitution.  They are possessed of 
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they 
themselves must respect their obligations to the State.  In our 
system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients 
of only that which the State chooses to communicate.  They may 
not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are 
officially approved.  In the absence of a specific showing of 
constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students 
are entitled to freedom of expression of their views.71 
Like Justice Jackson in Barnette, Justice Fortas stressed that freedom of 
speech is especially important in schools.  He quoted an earlier opinion 
from Justice Brennan declaring:  “The vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American 
schools.  The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”72 
Justice Fortas concluded his opinion by returning to this theme and 
again forcefully expressed the need to protect student speech: 
 
 69 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 70 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. at 637). 
 71 Id. at 511. 
 72 Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
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Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given 
only to be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in 
fact.  Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the right 
could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government 
has provided as a safe haven for crackpots.  The Constitution 
says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the right to 
free speech. This provision means what it says.73 
The expression of support for student speech in Tinker is much 
deeper than its single, most famous sentence.  A core theme is that the 
First Amendment protects student speech, and safeguarding such 
expression advances the First Amendment’s central purposes.  Justice 
Fortas regards safeguarding speech as a crucial part of educating 
students about the Constitution, rather than as a practice in tension 
with the schools’ mission.  
The second theme expressed throughout the opinion is schools may 
punish student speech only upon proof that the speech would 
“substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon 
the rights of other students.”74  Justice Fortas explained: 
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify 
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able 
to show that its action [is] . . . something more than a mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.  Certainly where there is 
no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden 
conduct would “materially and substantially interfere with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school,” the prohibition cannot be sustained.75 
At the end of the majority opinion, Justice Fortas returned to this 
theme and stated government regulation of student speech is 
unconstitutional unless it can be “justified by a showing that the 
students’ activities would materially and substantially disrupt the work 
and discipline of the school.”76  Mere fear of disruption is not enough.  
The burden is on the school to prove the need for restricting student 
speech, and the standard is a stringent one — there must be proof that 
the speech would “materially and substantially” disrupt the school.77 
 
 73 Id. at 513. 
 74 Id. at 509. 
 75 Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)). 
 76 Id. at 513. 
 77 Id. 
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The final theme expressed in Tinker is the need for careful judicial 
review to ensure the school has met this heavy burden.  Repeatedly 
throughout the opinion, Justice Fortas emphasized the lack of 
evidence to support punishing the speech.  Early in the opinion, he 
wrote:  “As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the 
circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or 
potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it.”78  Later he 
wrote:  “There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners’ 
interference, actual or nascent, with the schools’ work or of collision 
with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.”79  
He noted only a few of the students in a school system of 18,000 wore 
the armbands, and “[t]here [was] no indication that the work of the 
schools or any class was disrupted.”80 
In a crucial part of the opinion, Justice Fortas stated there must have 
been more than “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”81  He 
stated the district court made no finding that the speech would 
interfere with the schools’ activities and “our independent 
examination of the record fails to yield evidence that the school 
authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands 
would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge 
upon the rights of other students.”82 
Justice Fortas concluded the majority opinion by observing:  “[T]he 
record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have 
led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on 
the school premises in fact occurred.”83  Thus, it is not for a court to 
accept the claims of school officials about the need to stop the speech.  
The court must independently review the facts and determine whether 
there is sufficient evidence of significant disruptive effect to justify 
punishing expression. 
No subsequent Supreme Court decision has followed these 
principles.  Certainly, Morse, the most recent free speech case, did not 
use this approach.  There was no evidence of any disruption of school 
activities as a result of Frederick holding up the banner saying, 
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”  Chief Justice Roberts did not assert that 
 
 78 Id. at 505. 
 79 Id. at 508. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 509. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 514. 
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Frederick’s banner would have the slightest effect in encouraging drug 
use.  He could not do so.  It is questionable whether students 
understood the banner as encouraging drug use, and even if they did, 
it is doubtful any would be more likely to use drugs because of it.  
Justice Stevens expressed this well: 
This is a nonsense message, not advocacy.  The Court’s feeble 
effort to divine its hidden meaning is strong evidence of 
that. . . . Admittedly, some high school students (including 
those who use drugs) are dumb.  Most students, however, do 
not shed their brains at the schoolhouse gate, and most 
students know dumb advocacy when they see it.  The notion 
that the message on this banner would actually persuade either 
the average student or even the dumbest one to change his or 
her behavior is most implausible.84 
The Court in Morse adopted an approach of great deference to school 
officials that echoed Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker, not the approach 
followed by the seven-Justice majority.  Justice Black disputed the 
constitutional protection for students’ speech.  In Tinker, he wrote:  “I 
deny, therefore, that it has been the ‘unmistakable holding of this Court 
for almost 50 [sic] years’ that ‘students’ and ‘teachers’ take with them 
into the ‘schoolhouse gate’ constitutional rights to ‘freedom of speech or 
expression.’”85  Later in his dissenting opinion, Justice Black explicitly 
declared his view that there should be almost complete deference to the 
schools:  “Here the Court should accord [educational institutions] 
the . . . right to determine for themselves to what extent free expression 
should be allowed in its schools.”86  
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Morse similarly expresses 
the need for great deference to school principals.87  Although he does 
not go as far as Justice Thomas, who urged the express overruling of 
Tinker,88 in practical reality there is not much that remains of Tinker 
under the Roberts approach of deference to schools. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Tinker has not been expressly overruled, it can be revived as 
part of the framework for analyzing speech issues in public schools.  In 
 
 84 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2649 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 85 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 521 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion). 
 86 Id. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 87 See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2629. 
 88 See id. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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this essay, I have argued that a distinction can be drawn between 
curricular decisions, where there needs to be great deference to schools, 
and regulation of student speech outside the curricular area.  The latter 
should be governed by the Tinker standard — student speech should be 
punishable only if it is actually disruptive of school activities. 
Of course, as with any distinction, there will be hard cases in 
deciding what is curricular as opposed to non-curricular.  But focusing 
on whether the government is the speaker and on the underlying 
values of the First Amendment often should be helpful in resolving the 
hard cases.  Also, there will need to be determinations of whether 
student speech is actually disruptive of school activities.  But these are 
the right questions to focus on and will provide far more protection 
for First Amendment values than the Court’s approach in cases like 
Bethel, Hazelwood, and Morse. 
